203 lines
8.8 KiB
Plaintext
203 lines
8.8 KiB
Plaintext
## Configuration file for a typical Tor user
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## Last updated 12 September 2012 for Tor 0.2.4.3-alpha.
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## (may or may not work for much older or much newer versions of Tor.)
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##
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## Lines that begin with "## " try to explain what's going on. Lines
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## that begin with just "#" are disabled commands: you can enable them
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## by removing the "#" symbol.
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##
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## See 'man tor', or https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html,
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## for more options you can use in this file.
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##
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## Tor will look for this file in various places based on your platform:
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## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#torrc
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## Default username and group the server will run as
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User tor
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PIDFile /var/run/tor/tor.pid
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## Tor opens a socks proxy on port 9050 by default -- even if you don't
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## configure one below. Set "SocksPort 0" if you plan to run Tor only
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## as a relay, and not make any local application connections yourself.
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SocksPort 9050 # Default: Bind to localhost:9050 for local connections.
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#SocksPort 192.168.0.1:9100 # Bind to this address:port too.
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## Entry policies to allow/deny SOCKS requests based on IP address.
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## First entry that matches wins. If no SocksPolicy is set, we accept
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## all (and only) requests that reach a SocksPort. Untrusted users who
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## can access your SocksPort may be able to learn about the connections
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## you make.
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SocksPolicy accept 127.0.0.1
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SocksPolicy accept 192.168.4.5
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SocksPolicy accept 192.168.4.8
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SocksPolicy reject *
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## Logs go to stdout at level "notice" unless redirected by something
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## else, like one of the below lines. You can have as many Log lines as
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## you want.
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##
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## We advise using "notice" in most cases, since anything more verbose
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## may provide sensitive information to an attacker who obtains the logs.
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##
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## Send all messages of level 'notice' or higher to /var/lib/log/tor/notices.log
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#Log notice file /var/lib/log/tor/notices.log
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## Send every possible message to /var/lib/log/tor/debug.log
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#Log debug file /var/lib/log/tor/debug.log
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## Use the system log instead of Tor's logfiles
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#Log notice syslog
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## To send all messages to stderr:
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#Log debug stderr
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Log notice syslog
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## Uncomment this to start the process in the background... or use
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## --runasdaemon 1 on the command line. This is ignored on Windows;
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## see the FAQ entry if you want Tor to run as an NT service.
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RunAsDaemon 1
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## The directory for keeping all the keys/etc. By default, we store
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## things in $HOME/.tor on Unix, and in Application Data\tor on Windows.
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#DataDirectory /var/lib/lib/tor
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DataDirectory /var/lib/tor/data
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## The port on which Tor will listen for local connections from Tor
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## controller applications, as documented in control-spec.txt.
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#ControlPort 9051
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## If you enable the controlport, be sure to enable one of these
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## authentication methods, to prevent attackers from accessing it.
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#HashedControlPassword 16:872860B76453A77D60CA2BB8C1A7042072093276A3D701AD684053EC4C
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#CookieAuthentication 1
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############### This section is just for location-hidden services ###
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## Once you have configured a hidden service, you can look at the
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## contents of the file ".../hidden_service/hostname" for the address
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## to tell people.
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##
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## HiddenServicePort x y:z says to redirect requests on port x to the
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## address y:z.
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HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/hidden_service/
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HiddenServicePort 48142 127.0.0.1:48142
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HiddenServicePort 48143 127.0.0.1:48143
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#HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/lib/tor/other_hidden_service/
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#HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
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#HiddenServicePort 22 127.0.0.1:22
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HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/onioncat/
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HiddenServicePort 8060 127.0.0.1:8060
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################ This section is just for relays #####################
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#
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## See https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-doc-relay for details.
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## Required: what port to advertise for incoming Tor connections.
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#ORPort 9001
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## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
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## ORPort (e.g. to advertise 443 but bind to 9090), you can do it as
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## follows. You'll need to do ipchains or other port forwarding
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## yourself to make this work.
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#ORPort 443 NoListen
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#ORPort 127.0.0.1:9090 NoAdvertise
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## The IP address or full DNS name for incoming connections to your
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## relay. Leave commented out and Tor will guess.
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#Address noname.example.com
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## If you have multiple network interfaces, you can specify one for
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## outgoing traffic to use.
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# OutboundBindAddress 10.0.0.5
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## A handle for your relay, so people don't have to refer to it by key.
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#Nickname ididnteditheconfig
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## Define these to limit how much relayed traffic you will allow. Your
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## own traffic is still unthrottled. Note that RelayBandwidthRate must
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## be at least 20 KB.
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## Note that units for these config options are bytes per second, not bits
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## per second, and that prefixes are binary prefixes, i.e. 2^10, 2^20, etc.
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#RelayBandwidthRate 100 KB # Throttle traffic to 100KB/s (800Kbps)
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#RelayBandwidthBurst 200 KB # But allow bursts up to 200KB/s (1600Kbps)
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## Use these to restrict the maximum traffic per day, week, or month.
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## Note that this threshold applies separately to sent and received bytes,
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## not to their sum: setting "4 GB" may allow up to 8 GB total before
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## hibernating.
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##
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## Set a maximum of 4 gigabytes each way per period.
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#AccountingMax 4 GB
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## Each period starts daily at midnight (AccountingMax is per day)
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#AccountingStart day 00:00
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## Each period starts on the 3rd of the month at 15:00 (AccountingMax
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## is per month)
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#AccountingStart month 3 15:00
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## Contact info to be published in the directory, so we can contact you
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## if your relay is misconfigured or something else goes wrong. Google
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## indexes this, so spammers might also collect it.
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#ContactInfo Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>
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## You might also include your PGP or GPG fingerprint if you have one:
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#ContactInfo 0xFFFFFFFF Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>
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## Uncomment this to mirror directory information for others. Please do
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## if you have enough bandwidth.
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#DirPort 9030 # what port to advertise for directory connections
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## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
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## DirPort (e.g. to advertise 80 but bind to 9091), you can do it as
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## follows. below too. You'll need to do ipchains or other port
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## forwarding yourself to make this work.
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#DirPort 80 NoListen
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#DirPort 127.0.0.1:9091 NoAdvertise
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## Uncomment to return an arbitrary blob of html on your DirPort. Now you
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## can explain what Tor is if anybody wonders why your IP address is
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## contacting them. See contrib/tor-exit-notice.html in Tor's source
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## distribution for a sample.
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#DirPortFrontPage /etc/tor/tor-exit-notice.html
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## Uncomment this if you run more than one Tor relay, and add the identity
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## key fingerprint of each Tor relay you control, even if they're on
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## different networks. You declare it here so Tor clients can avoid
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## using more than one of your relays in a single circuit. See
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## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#MultipleRelays
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## However, you should never include a bridge's fingerprint here, as it would
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## break its concealability and potentionally reveal its IP/TCP address.
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#MyFamily $keyid,$keyid,...
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## A comma-separated list of exit policies. They're considered first
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## to last, and the first match wins. If you want to _replace_
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## the default exit policy, end this with either a reject *:* or an
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## accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_ (prepending to) the
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## default exit policy. Leave commented to just use the default, which is
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## described in the man page or at
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## https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html
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##
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## Look at https://www.torproject.org/faq-abuse.html#TypicalAbuses
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## for issues you might encounter if you use the default exit policy.
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##
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## If certain IPs and ports are blocked externally, e.g. by your firewall,
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## you should update your exit policy to reflect this -- otherwise Tor
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## users will be told that those destinations are down.
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##
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## For security, by default Tor rejects connections to private (local)
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## networks, including to your public IP address. See the man page entry
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## for ExitPolicyRejectPrivate if you want to allow "exit enclaving".
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##
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#ExitPolicy accept *:6660-6667,reject *:* # allow irc ports but no more
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#ExitPolicy accept *:119 # accept nntp as well as default exit policy
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#ExitPolicy reject *:* # no exits allowed
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## Bridge relays (or "bridges") are Tor relays that aren't listed in the
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## main directory. Since there is no complete public list of them, even an
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## ISP that filters connections to all the known Tor relays probably
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## won't be able to block all the bridges. Also, websites won't treat you
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## differently because they won't know you're running Tor. If you can
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## be a real relay, please do; but if not, be a bridge!
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#BridgeRelay 1
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## By default, Tor will advertise your bridge to users through various
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## mechanisms like https://bridges.torproject.org/. If you want to run
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## a private bridge, for example because you'll give out your bridge
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## address manually to your friends, uncomment this line:
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#PublishServerDescriptor 0
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