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										 |  |  | ## Configuration file for a typical Tor user | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## Last updated 12 September 2012 for Tor 0.2.4.3-alpha. | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## (may or may not work for much older or much newer versions of Tor.) | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## Lines that begin with "## " try to explain what's going on. Lines | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## that begin with just "#" are disabled commands: you can enable them | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## by removing the "#" symbol. | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## See 'man tor', or https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html, | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## for more options you can use in this file. | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## Tor will look for this file in various places based on your platform: | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#torrc | 
					
						
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							|  |  |  | ## Default username and group the server will run as | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | User tor | 
					
						
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							|  |  |  | PIDFile /var/run/tor/tor.pid | 
					
						
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							|  |  |  | ## Tor opens a socks proxy on port 9050 by default -- even if you don't | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## configure one below. Set "SocksPort 0" if you plan to run Tor only | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## as a relay, and not make any local application connections yourself. | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | SocksPort 9050 # Default: Bind to localhost:9050 for local connections. | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | #SocksPort 192.168.0.1:9100 # Bind to this address:port too. | 
					
						
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							|  |  |  | ## Entry policies to allow/deny SOCKS requests based on IP address. | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## First entry that matches wins. If no SocksPolicy is set, we accept | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## all (and only) requests that reach a SocksPort. Untrusted users who | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## can access your SocksPort may be able to learn about the connections | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## you make. | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | SocksPolicy accept 127.0.0.1 | 
					
						
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										 |  |  | SocksPolicy accept 192.168.0.12 | 
					
						
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										 |  |  | SocksPolicy accept 192.168.4.8 | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | SocksPolicy reject * | 
					
						
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							|  |  |  | ## Logs go to stdout at level "notice" unless redirected by something | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## else, like one of the below lines. You can have as many Log lines as | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## you want. | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## We advise using "notice" in most cases, since anything more verbose | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## may provide sensitive information to an attacker who obtains the logs. | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## Send all messages of level 'notice' or higher to /var/lib/log/tor/notices.log | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | #Log notice file /var/lib/log/tor/notices.log | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## Send every possible message to /var/lib/log/tor/debug.log | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | #Log debug file /var/lib/log/tor/debug.log | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## Use the system log instead of Tor's logfiles | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | #Log notice syslog | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## To send all messages to stderr: | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | #Log debug stderr | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | Log notice syslog | 
					
						
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							|  |  |  | ## Uncomment this to start the process in the background... or use | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## --runasdaemon 1 on the command line. This is ignored on Windows; | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## see the FAQ entry if you want Tor to run as an NT service. | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | RunAsDaemon 1 | 
					
						
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							|  |  |  | ## The directory for keeping all the keys/etc. By default, we store | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## things in $HOME/.tor on Unix, and in Application Data\tor on Windows. | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | #DataDirectory /var/lib/lib/tor | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | DataDirectory   /var/lib/tor/data | 
					
						
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							|  |  |  | ## The port on which Tor will listen for local connections from Tor | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## controller applications, as documented in control-spec.txt. | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | #ControlPort 9051 | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## If you enable the controlport, be sure to enable one of these | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## authentication methods, to prevent attackers from accessing it. | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | #HashedControlPassword 16:872860B76453A77D60CA2BB8C1A7042072093276A3D701AD684053EC4C | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | #CookieAuthentication 1 | 
					
						
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							|  |  |  | ############### This section is just for location-hidden services ### | 
					
						
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							|  |  |  | ## Once you have configured a hidden service, you can look at the | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## contents of the file ".../hidden_service/hostname" for the address | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## to tell people. | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## HiddenServicePort x y:z says to redirect requests on port x to the | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## address y:z. | 
					
						
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							|  |  |  | HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/hidden_service/ | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | HiddenServicePort 48142 127.0.0.1:48142 | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | HiddenServicePort 48143 127.0.0.1:48143 | 
					
						
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							|  |  |  | #HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/lib/tor/other_hidden_service/ | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | #HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80 | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | #HiddenServicePort 22 127.0.0.1:22 | 
					
						
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							|  |  |  | HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/onioncat/ | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | HiddenServicePort 8060 127.0.0.1:8060 | 
					
						
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							|  |  |  | ################ This section is just for relays ##################### | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | # | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## See https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-doc-relay for details. | 
					
						
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							|  |  |  | ## Required: what port to advertise for incoming Tor connections. | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | #ORPort 9001 | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## ORPort (e.g. to advertise 443 but bind to 9090), you can do it as | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## follows.  You'll need to do ipchains or other port forwarding | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## yourself to make this work. | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | #ORPort 443 NoListen | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | #ORPort 127.0.0.1:9090 NoAdvertise | 
					
						
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							|  |  |  | ## The IP address or full DNS name for incoming connections to your | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## relay. Leave commented out and Tor will guess. | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | #Address noname.example.com | 
					
						
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							|  |  |  | ## If you have multiple network interfaces, you can specify one for | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## outgoing traffic to use. | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | # OutboundBindAddress 10.0.0.5 | 
					
						
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							|  |  |  | ## A handle for your relay, so people don't have to refer to it by key. | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | #Nickname ididnteditheconfig | 
					
						
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							|  |  |  | ## Define these to limit how much relayed traffic you will allow. Your | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## own traffic is still unthrottled. Note that RelayBandwidthRate must | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## be at least 20 KB. | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## Note that units for these config options are bytes per second, not bits | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## per second, and that prefixes are binary prefixes, i.e. 2^10, 2^20, etc. | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | #RelayBandwidthRate 100 KB  # Throttle traffic to 100KB/s (800Kbps) | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | #RelayBandwidthBurst 200 KB # But allow bursts up to 200KB/s (1600Kbps) | 
					
						
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							|  |  |  | ## Use these to restrict the maximum traffic per day, week, or month. | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## Note that this threshold applies separately to sent and received bytes, | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## not to their sum: setting "4 GB" may allow up to 8 GB total before | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## hibernating. | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## Set a maximum of 4 gigabytes each way per period. | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | #AccountingMax 4 GB | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## Each period starts daily at midnight (AccountingMax is per day) | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | #AccountingStart day 00:00 | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## Each period starts on the 3rd of the month at 15:00 (AccountingMax | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## is per month) | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | #AccountingStart month 3 15:00 | 
					
						
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							|  |  |  | ## Contact info to be published in the directory, so we can contact you | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## if your relay is misconfigured or something else goes wrong. Google | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## indexes this, so spammers might also collect it. | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | #ContactInfo Random Person <nobody AT example dot com> | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## You might also include your PGP or GPG fingerprint if you have one: | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | #ContactInfo 0xFFFFFFFF Random Person <nobody AT example dot com> | 
					
						
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							|  |  |  | ## Uncomment this to mirror directory information for others. Please do | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## if you have enough bandwidth. | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | #DirPort 9030 # what port to advertise for directory connections | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## DirPort (e.g. to advertise 80 but bind to 9091), you can do it as | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## follows.  below too. You'll need to do ipchains or other port | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## forwarding yourself to make this work. | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | #DirPort 80 NoListen | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | #DirPort 127.0.0.1:9091 NoAdvertise | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## Uncomment to return an arbitrary blob of html on your DirPort. Now you | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## can explain what Tor is if anybody wonders why your IP address is | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## contacting them. See contrib/tor-exit-notice.html in Tor's source | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## distribution for a sample. | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | #DirPortFrontPage /etc/tor/tor-exit-notice.html | 
					
						
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							|  |  |  | ## Uncomment this if you run more than one Tor relay, and add the identity | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## key fingerprint of each Tor relay you control, even if they're on | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## different networks. You declare it here so Tor clients can avoid | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## using more than one of your relays in a single circuit. See | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#MultipleRelays | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## However, you should never include a bridge's fingerprint here, as it would | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## break its concealability and potentionally reveal its IP/TCP address. | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | #MyFamily $keyid,$keyid,... | 
					
						
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							|  |  |  | ## A comma-separated list of exit policies. They're considered first | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## to last, and the first match wins. If you want to _replace_ | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## the default exit policy, end this with either a reject *:* or an | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_ (prepending to) the | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## default exit policy. Leave commented to just use the default, which is | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## described in the man page or at | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## Look at https://www.torproject.org/faq-abuse.html#TypicalAbuses | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## for issues you might encounter if you use the default exit policy. | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## If certain IPs and ports are blocked externally, e.g. by your firewall, | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## you should update your exit policy to reflect this -- otherwise Tor | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## users will be told that those destinations are down. | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## For security, by default Tor rejects connections to private (local) | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## networks, including to your public IP address. See the man page entry | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## for ExitPolicyRejectPrivate if you want to allow "exit enclaving". | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | #ExitPolicy accept *:6660-6667,reject *:* # allow irc ports but no more | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | #ExitPolicy accept *:119 # accept nntp as well as default exit policy | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | #ExitPolicy reject *:* # no exits allowed | 
					
						
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							|  |  |  | ## Bridge relays (or "bridges") are Tor relays that aren't listed in the | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## main directory. Since there is no complete public list of them, even an | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## ISP that filters connections to all the known Tor relays probably | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## won't be able to block all the bridges. Also, websites won't treat you | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## differently because they won't know you're running Tor. If you can | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## be a real relay, please do; but if not, be a bridge! | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | #BridgeRelay 1 | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## By default, Tor will advertise your bridge to users through various | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## mechanisms like https://bridges.torproject.org/. If you want to run | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## a private bridge, for example because you'll give out your bridge | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | ## address manually to your friends, uncomment this line: | 
					
						
							|  |  |  | #PublishServerDescriptor 0 | 
					
						
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